This is primarily a response to Kirk Leech's article in the Guardian arguing that the protests against the Sardar Sarovar Project on the Narmada are unjustified in light of the benefits the project promises. I take issue with three themes that seem to run across Leech's article:
1. Ignoring the politics of the statistics he relies on.
Leech has failed to address the controversy that surrounds the very statistics that he has quoted in the article. Dilip D'Souza in his book 'The Narmada Dammed: Inquiry into the Politics of Development' exposes the manner in which governments have repeatedly inflated the benefits and downplayed the number of project afffected people. Leech's statistic that the dam will benefit 40 million people by 2021 is a perfect example. The projected figure for 2021, D'Souza shows, was 20 million in 1988 and within a matter of a few years jumped to 40 million. Similarly, the number of project affected people was initially published by government sources to be 100,000 and as the Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) package proved difficult to implement, the number has come down to 40,000.
2. Seeing the contemporary struggle against raising the height of the dam as unjustified.
Leech's last paragraph captures a lot of what is wrong with the article. His suggestion that the struggle should have been for better R&R packages rings hollow. The R&R package that is part of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) award is the best India has ever seen for victims of development projects. The land for land scheme and the explicit denial of the cash for land option, land for all 'major sons', land for landless labourers affected are all positive features of the package. Unfortunately, the political will, that has informed pushing the project ahead, has never extended to implementing the R&R benefits.
3. Ignoring the Central Position that Rehabilitation Occupies in the Contemporary Protests in the Narmada Valley.
Leech seems to believe that the main demand of the 'protestors' is to stop the contruction of the dam. This position fails to capture the significant shift in strategy. The nature of the protest has, in a sense, come a full circle. John Wood in 'The Politics of Water Resource Devekopment in India' has documented how the initial NGO movement in the 1980s, before Medha Patkar came on the scene, was carried on by ARCH-Vahini. ARCH-Vahini's emphasis was on getting the best terms of compensation for the oustees in Gujarat and was far more moderate in its stance than the radical position of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). The NBA's position that it was opposed to any construction whatsoever resulted in the Gujarat Government refusing to engage with it. The ARCH-Vahini, however, succeeded in getting crucial concessions from the Gujarat government on R&R.
It was the NBA that succeeded in bringing the Narmada Valley to the national and international stage. After organising many mass protests through the 90s and even succeeeding in getting the World Bank to withdraw, the NBA decided to take the isuue to the Supreme Court. This strategy, atleast in retrospect, was an all or nothing move. Justice Kirpal in the 2000 judgment (Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India) famously coined the term 'Publicity Interest Litigation' in the judgment and it epitomised why the strategy had backfired on the NBA. (One of the most cogent criticisms of the judgment was by Ramaswamy Iyer in the EPW titled ‘A Judgment of Grave Import’, Vol. 35 No. 45 November 04 - November 10, 2000). Involving the Courts in a political mass movement of this kind brings with it tremendous risks. And unfortunately for the NBA, those risks materialised in the 2000 judgment.
Given that the NBA's radical stance of opposing any construction was no longer an option, there was a clear shift towards fighting for the proper implementation of the R&R package. The NBA’s new strategy resulted in another case before the Supreme Court in 2005. Justice Sinha in his judgment laid down the basis for the contemporary protests on the Narmada issue. In essence, it said that before the height of the dam was to be raised at any point, the concerned governments had to first complete the R&R of all Project Affected Persons (PAPs).
Leech simplifies the debate surrounding the project far too much. The issue has always been very complex. Even way back in 1972 when Indira Gandhi was at the height of her popularity after the 1971 liberation of Bangladesh and had Congress Chief Ministers in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan, she failed to resolve the issue politically. That dispute between the states was laid to rest by the NWDT Award and it was then that the phase of mass movements began. Leech chooses to see only the benefits and view the opposition to the dam as a major irritant, nothing more. He refuses to see the issues of justice being denied to the Project Affected Persons. Oustees being given cash compensation in express violation of the NWDT Award, terrible alternate housing conditions, handing out of uncultivable land are all issues at the heart of the R&R issue. He fails to see the very real human cost of going ahead with a project with extremely unclear benefits. Ramawamy Iyer captures this sentiment of the protestors being irritants in an Op-Ed for The Hindu (March 2008) after observing proceedings in the Supreme Court which were brought to seek relief for non-compliance with the 2005 judgment. The Supreme Court refused to adjudicate on the validity of the Special Rehabilitation Package that is in force now that allows for cash compensation to oustees. It asked the PMO to resolve the issue. This captures the tragedy of the Narmada project. Ruling out cash compensation was at the very heart of the R&R package by the NWDT. The concerns about a 'land for land' policy that Upendra Baxi raises in his article ('What Happens Next is Upto You: Human Rights at Risk in Dams and Development, 16 American Univ. Intl. Law Rev. 1507 at 1521) would seem irrelevant in the context of the Narmada dams. The NWDT Award includes land for landless labourers who will be affected by the project as well. Even the concern about individuals not getting arable land in locations of their choice has been addressed to some extent in the NWDT Award. Cash compensation for such groups ensures their life long marginalisation because it rarely ever is a continuing source of income in these situations like land. The problem with cash compensation is that it more or less ensures migration to urban centres and most likely to the slums. It destroys the right to live as a community. In most cases, it takes away their only source of livelihood. The burden on the individual to migrate and find other land themselves is fraught with numerous complications. Cash compensation is undoubtedly the 'practical' way out in the Narmada Valley. Clearly the value of certain kind of lives can be sacrificed at the altar of practicality.
Posts
